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“If You Desire to Enter into Life”: 
Orientations for a Consistent Relational 
and Sexual Ethics Starting from 
the Narrative of the Rich Young Man
Introduction: Is Diversity Becoming 
the New Social and Ethical Mantra?
I would like to start with a paradox of our present Western societies, namely that on the one hand, there is “much law and little emotion” and, on the other, 
“much emotion and little law.” Confronted with all sorts of increasing roughness 
and brutality, aggressiveness and violence, the calls for “law and order” and 
zero tolerance get even louder not only in society at large but also at schools 
and in education. Emotion in empathy and understanding thus retreats to 
the background, ending up in “too much law and too little emotion.” On the 
other hand, in our welfare societies the emphasis lies strongly on the individual 
and one’s preferences namely - in contrast with “universal reason” - one’s own 
emotions and desires, which is also sometimes called “expressive individualism.” 
at which determines what one does is not what is right or wrong but what is 
fun and pleasant. 
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 is culture of personal preference, namely what one likes and longs for, as the 
best self-expression, manifests itself today especially on the level of relationships and 
intimate life forms. Multiple possibilities and choices are on o"er that have become 
moreover equivalent. Do you want to experiment? Do you want partner swapping? 
Or do you opt only for a stable relationship? Do you want #rst to cohabit and then 
get married? Or do you only want to cohabit and start a family? And why are only 
heterosexual relationships acceptable and thus relationships between gays and 
lesbians inferior? And why is “living together apart” out of the question? Or why 
must marriage remain indissoluble? And should there not be room a$er divorce for 
new relationships, with or without marriage? Anything goes! It seems that in our 
secularized, pluralistic societies diversity and di"erence have become not only a social 
fact but also an ethical norm, an “ideal” to be cherished: the new social and political 
mantra where everyone follows one’s choice and fancy (envie) and cannot force the 
other to make the same choice. It is clear that in this trend of individualization and 
sentimentalization the “law” recedes to the background, ending up in “too much 
emotion and too little law.” 
  e challenge, in our opinion, is not in pitting both positions against each 
other but in reconciling them with each other: no subjectivity without objectivity; 
no emotion and desire without law, and vice versa. We would like to take up this 
challenge via a philosophical in depth reading of the Gospel narrative of the so-
called rich young man, at least of its #rst part.1 is narrative indeed challenges us 
to re&ect on the paradoxical and creative interaction between boundary lines and 
freedom, prohibition and taste, ethics and aesthetics. is re&ection will enable us, in 
the #rst part of this article, to pay special attention to the educational implications, 
among others the importance of the educative community as a “community of 
participation.” is approach will likewise o"er an inspiring framework to develop, 
in the second part of the article, a consistent relational and sexual ethics “beyond 
diversity” that is applicable not only to marriage but also to other forms of intimacy: 
premarital sexuality; pre-, non- and post-marital cohabitation, homosexual and 
lesbian relationships, remarriage or cohabitation a$er divorce, without this having to 
lead to an “axiological equalization” of all these intimate life forms.
A Paradoxical Relationship 
between Prohibition and Freedom
Let us now apply ourselves to the #rst part of the Gospel narrative known 
as the parable of the rich young man, as it is found in the synoptic Gospels: 
 1 Paul Beauchamp, La loi de Dieu: D’une montagne à l’autre (Paris: Seuil), 1999.
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Matthew (19:16-19), Mark (10:17-19) and Luke (18:18-20), each with small but 
not unimportant variations or unique accents, and this from the very beginning, 
namely from the question of the rich man himself.2
“Good Teacher, What Good Deed Must I Do?”
As in many other Gospel narratives, someone approaches Jesus to ask 
him something. In contrast to Matthew, Luke does not specify whether this 
“someone” is a “young man,” but refers to him as a wealthy “ruler.” His classic 
question to Jesus is usually phrased somewhat like the following: “Master [or 
Teacher, rabbi], what must I do to have eternal life?” e rich man asks this 
question as well, but he adds something to it that is not present in the other 
Gospel narratives: “Master, what good deed must I do to have eternal life?” (Mt 
19:16), or: “Good Master, what must I do to inherit eternal life?” (Lk 18:18 and 
Mk 10:17). is addition immediately situates the question of the wealthy and 
socially well appreciated man. at Jesus understands this question in a rather 
specic way is apparent from his reply: “Why do you ask me about what is good? 
ere is only one who is good” (Mt 19:17), or: “Why do you call me good? No 
one is good but God alone” (Lk 18:19 and Mk 10:18). In actuality, the rich man 
is searching for someone who can infallibly tell him what he must do to gain 
eternal life. Eternal life does not mean, in the rst place, a life aer death, but a 
full and successful life in this world, which naturally also opens up a perspective 
to the future, eternal life.
e rich man, who is in search of a kind of “master” or reliable guide, 
represents the longing of every person to know exactly what he or she must do. 
People search for an “expert” who has access to the mysteries of the fullness of 
life and who is able to furnish the “ordinary lay person” with the exact code 
of behaviour to reach it. Much of the popular (Western and non-Western) 
literature of today and in numerous weeklies, this morality of the “guru” appears 
under the guise of the advice from psychologists, sexologists, therapists, or one 
or the other specialists (usually in the human/social sciences), or a “life coach” 
or a spiritual guru who grants “mindful” counsel: “How to become happy in 
seven simple steps” (“seven” is a number of perfection). Here we can cite the 
French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. He points out that human desire is quite 
vulnerable since it is characterized by a shortcoming, a negativity, that precisely 
“drives” the human person to go search for “an authority who is assumed to be 
knowing and able” (une autorité supposée savoir et pouvoir). In search of answers 
 2 Xavier évenot, Sou"rance, bonheur, éthique: Conférénces spirituelles (Mulhouse: Salvator, 
1990), 61-89.
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to their existential questions, humans o!en carry out “in full faith and surrender” 
what their “masters” advise or “prescribe.” 
It is actually at this point that the question of the rich and respected man 
returns: “To which good master or perfect guru, who can tell me exactly what 
good must I do to become happy, can I entrust myself ?” Hence, the addition of 
the adjective “good” in the title “Master” in the Gospel text, with which the rich 
man tries to seduce Jesus to become his “private-guide” who would solve his life 
problem. What is remarkable, however, is that Jesus sees through this seductive 
manoeuvre and thus simply refuses to be such a “guru.” He resolutely refuses to 
be a “pre-given model” that people only have to copy. at is why in his answer 
“ere is only one, who is good,” he refers to God whom we do not see, who is 
transcendent. Precisely because only God is good, no one in this world may ever 
be called totally good. We should never raise someone to the level of master who 
would prescribe everything and determine, in a normative sense, our personal 
code of behaviour or programme of life.
Jesus refuses to step into the place of the rich respectable man who symbolizes 
every human person: one who has acquired possessions and power and thus 
receives acknowledgement, but still recognizes a deeper need within oneself. 
Jesus does not want to destroy human freedom or desire; he refuses to say that 
one should blindly obey another person. In other words, Jesus protects human 
freedom and desire. Here we touch upon a neuralgic point in Christian religion, 
and perhaps in all religions. All too o!en the emphasis has been (is being?) laid 
on the dependence of humans on their Creator and Redeemer. Faith, however, 
should not be reduced to what Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) famously 
called a schlechthinniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl (feeling of absolute dependence). 
On the contrary, in the Jewish-Christian religion of the covenant, the human 
person is called to become the image and co-creator of God (Elohim) and the 
partner of the Lord of liberation (JHWH) whereby the covenant also becomes 
e#ective. In that way, the human person is elevated in and by the “before-the-
wholly-Other” to an independent, free and responsible “ally” who shares in the 
full joy of the Lord. In a very concrete manner, Jesus conrms this view on the 
human person: He pushes him not in the direction of meekness but rather in the 
direction of freedom and boldness. In other words, Jesus challenges the rich man 
to go out of his own accord - free and responsible - on the path of life, or rather 
the path to full life.3
 3 Roger Burggraeve, et al., eds., Desriable God? Our Fascination with Images, Idols and New 
Deities (Leuven: Peeters, 2003), 261-271.
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“If You Desire to Enter into Life, Keep the Commandments”
is does not mean that Jesus abandons the rich man to his own fate. He 
safeguards human freedom and desire but not in the absolute sense, because 
he wants to “protect” people from unbridled freedom and wild desire but 
without discharging them of the risks that are coupled with their freedom and 
responsibility. Hence Jesus, a"er he has rst opened up the path to freedom, still 
follows up on the question with the paradoxical assertion: “If you desire to enter 
into life, keep the commandments” (Mt 19:17).
At rst sight, one could interpret this reply as a prescription. With this, 
however, Jesus does not refer to a special, personal code of behaviour for one 
particular individual. On the contrary, he unmasks the longing for an absolute, 
personal and exclusive guru by referring to the “known” commandments, as we 
read in Matthew’s version: “[!e rich man] said to him, ‘Which ones?’ Jesus 
said to him, ‘You shall not murder; You shall not commit adultery; You shall 
not steal; You shall not bear false witness” (Mt 19:18a): or as in the versions 
of Mark and Luke: “You know the commandments” (Mk 10:19a; Lk 18:20a). 
With this, he refers to the Ten Commandments, as we know them from the Old 
Testament where they appear twice, namely in the book of Exodus (20:1-17) 
and in Deuteronomy (5:6-21). Jesus does not present something new, much less 
something special, to the rich man of which he could a"erwards boast. For the 
path to life Jesus gives no special or exceptional directions, no unique code that 
would rest on one or the other foreknowledge or initiation. In other words, Jesus 
rejects any form of gnosis in ethics that rests on access to the “secret” of true life 
on the basis of a special election and initiation by a “special” master. By this, we 
mean a “total” master, who in private reciprocity gives one the feeling that there 
exists a “wisdom for me alone” that I can jealously nurture. One is free to identify 
with this “wisdom” in megalomania, in an uncritical delusion of power whereby, 
without one’s knowing it, one meets his/her own doom. 
Moreover, the commandments that Jesus cites are actually not commandments, 
but prohibitions. More specically, they are prohibitions from the second tablet 
of the Ten Commandments, which concerns this-worldly social life (the rst 
tablet concerns one’s relationship to God) (cf. Mt 19:18-19): “You shall not 
murder”; “You shall not commit adultery”; “You shall not steal”; “You shall not 
bear false witness” (“you shall not lie”); with one exception, “Honour your father 
and mother”. !is exception, however, is not a real exception, since the positive 
norm is not a concrete behavioural rule, but a “dispositional norm” (see ina). 
It only indicates the attitude of children towards parents, without dening what 
they must “do” concretely in order to substantiate this attitude of respect and 
gratitude towards the generation(s) that preceded them. Finally, Jesus rounds up 
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the series by adding the general commandment of love of neighbour as a synthesis: 
“You shall love your neighbour as yourself ” (Mt 19:19b). As a commandment, 
this again does not indicate any concrete manner of acting, but only a global 
orientation that expresses the “animating core” of the preceding norms.
How Prohibitions can Lead to the Path Towards Full Life?
!e question, however, is how prohibition can open up the path to full life. 
Are not prohibition and negativity, life and positivity, radical opposites? !e 
answer to this question will immediately oer us an insight into the relationship 
- tension and cohesion - between desire and law.4
As negative formulations, prohibitions sound to us at rst as hard, in$exible 
and inexorable. ey directly go against the megalomaniacal dynamism of our 
desires that want “everything at once.” Such desires are not only unreasonable 
in their endeavours, but their internal structure cannot accept any form of 
hindrance or questioning. at is why it is perfectly “normal” that time and again 
we human beings have diculty with ethics, since through its “prohibitions” it 
poses demands before us to which this “natural” desire, i.e. in its spontaneous 
dynamism, is not disposed. A prohibition does not appeal to us precisely because 
it goes against the “natural” wishes and longings of our heart. 
Upon closer inspection, however, a prohibition works more positively than a 
commandment (or prescriptive behavioural norm). is is precisely the paradox 
of the prohibition: at rst sight the prohibition displays itself as utterly negative, 
while upon closer inspection it actually works positively. Yet throughout its 
negativity a prohibition creates more space for freedom and creativity than 
the commandment (to be understood here as the prescription of a particular 
behaviour). A forbidding, negatively formulated behavioural norm opens the 
eld of human possibilities because it alone delineates the bottom line of the 
humane. In addition, it does not itself establish and ll in, in a normative way, 
the humane or the meaningful. In so doing the meaningful acquires a dynamic, 
unending, trans-normative character. 
e unique characteristic of the prohibition is that it appeals to human 
creativity by closing o the impasses. A quite simple example from the sphere 
of education will make this clear. Imagine a family with children that go for a 
walk through a forest. When they end up in a path that splits into ve directions, 
the “problem” arises as to which path the children will have to take. e parents 
can tackle this problem in two ways. One option would be that they themselves 
 4 Emmanuel Levinas, New Talmudic Readings (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 
1999), 59-62.
“If You Desire to Enter into Life” – Roger Burggraeve 69
determine which path is best for their children, and impose this path in a 
normative manner. With this option they can act directly in an imperative and 
authoritative way. Usually, however, this option concretely incarnates itself in a 
more indirect fashion. at is, the parents act indirectly by means of enticement 
and “aestheticizing” the “best way.” e indirect model allows the parents to try 
to “rouse their children’s interest” (rather than brutally “beautiful” and enticing 
manner which they can conceive. For instance, the parents may tell the children 
that the largest circus ever awaits them - as a wonderful reward - at the end of 
that path, and that along the way to the circus they would encounter the most 
colourful and delightful attractions in all sorts of clowns, artists, acrobats and 
magicians. By opting for the indirect manner of presenting which path the 
children should follow, the parents not only present the “end-goal” as pleasant, 
but the path itself as well.5 us, they hope to bring their children, “without 
force” as it were, to choose on their own for what they have determined to be, 
and described as, the “best” path. is educational didactic, however, is still based 
on ideological manipulation, which is why the indirect form of the rst option 
does not constitute another option as such and remains only a permutation on 
the basic formula of parochial imposition. e indirect form simply camouages 
its moralizing and authoritarian-imposing character behind the façade of an 
aestheticized or embellished positive value-attraction. In this way, the freedom 
of the growing person is strongly limited, if not radically harmed and destroyed. 
e other possibility, or authentic second option, consists in a model whereby 
the parents only intervene educatively, when their children are in danger of 
following one of the ve paths which the parents know to be a dead end road: 
“Don’t you see that the sign says: ‘No entry: Dead end Road’?” By means of this 
approach the creativity of the children is not tampered with. On the contrary, 
the children’s creativity is spurred on towards further development, since four 
other paths lay open which are not being demarcated as dead ends. e children 
are free to explore these other paths that lead to somewhere unknown, but 
nevertheless somewhere relatively fecund and/or safe. e prohibition does not 
say what the children must do or what is best for them; it only says what they are 
not allowed to do so that they do not end up needlessly disappointed, harmed 
or stranded. In other words, the prohibition only refers to the other paths as 
possibilities by refusing entrance to the dead-end road, or rather by forbidding 
it. e prohibition possesses therefore “the virtue of the negative”: it prevents 
one from being a mercenary of the law, that is, a slavish follower and executor 
 5 We can call this an o!en occurring but not necessary perversion of aesthetics, of which we 
shall sketch its positive signicance below.
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of the prescription. In the !nal analysis, abstaining from a non-value, namely 
not committing an o"ence, is in itself no merit. Even though this restraint can 
already entail much accomplishment and e"ort, still everything else remains 
to be done. One who has committed no o"ence still has done nothing – even 
though he has done nothing wrong. 
Prohibitions Reveal Dead End Roads
The prohibition should also not be confused in any way with one or the 
other forms of coercion. It only makes an appeal to the freedom of choice of 
the person involved and does not effectively hinder this person from indeed 
opting for the dead end road. People can indeed set foot on the dead end road 
and try it out themselves, if they absolutely wish to do so. The prohibition 
does not hinder such a decision as it only points to the risks of the choice 
in a “verbal” way. The prohibition is a linguistic event that is dialogical: it 
is directed by one person - someone who represents the tradition with all 
of its experiential knowledge - to another person who does not yet avail 
of or insufficiently avails of the tradition’s experiential wisdom. By means 
of the fact that the prohibition is spoken as a word event between people, 
the hearer of the prohibition can listen to this word both positively as well 
as turn a deaf ear to it. Thus, we come to understand that a prohibition is 
the exact opposite of physical, psychological, social or mental coercion. A 
prohibition, in other words, not only presupposes freedom, but also founds 
and promotes freedom. Those, however, who disregard the prohibition and 
still take the dead end road will surely find out that indeed their choice has 
led to being stranded and that they are now obliged to trace back their steps 
(if that is still possible, for the “dead end possibility” can also be quite lethal, 
such that no return is ever possible or such that one can no longer “land on 
one’s feet”). This implies that the prohibition (“you may not take this road 
for it is a dead end”) should not be a lie, but on the contrary, should rest on 
reliable experiential wisdom. 
Applied to the prohibitions of the second tablet of the Ten 
Commandments, all this means the following: these prohibitions form the 
“basic conditions” for loving. We need to take this term literally: prohibitions 
are the indispensable “conditions” for a meaningful relational and social life, 
but they do not qualitatively describe or constitute humane relationships 
and society itself. If they would do so, then they would lay down the surplus, 
while as a dynamic event it must maintain precisely an open (unending) 
growth perspective. Prohibitions only open the perspective to the integral 
excellence of love, without normatively portraying this love according to 
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concrete models and ways of acting. In this sense the prohibitions are only 
the first necessary stage on the path to freedom and love.6
We can also see them as the channel in whose banks love is entrenched. 
Concretely, the prohibitions of the second tablet of the Ten Commandments 
form the banks that receive the water from the river and let them ow abundantly. 
If the river would overow its banks it can cause great damage and destruction, 
or it can degenerate into a swamp in which one would sink. If the water remains 
within the banks then the river curves along the landscape with its hills and 
valleys, berths and views. As banks that entrench the river, they also drive along 
the course of the river without themselves being the source and the force of the 
river. Desire and its emotion, not the law, is the source of life and love. And so 
that desire would not turn into wild and destructive passion, it indeed needs the 
entrenchment of the law to become a river that nds its way to the open sea. 
Prohibitions Create Space for Ethical Growth
By means of opening the path for freedom, prohibitions also open the path for 
personal creativity. Such creativity may itself give shape, according to one’s own 
insight and ability, to the value protected and proled by the prohibition. !e 
prohibition points only to a “path to death”; as for the rest, it leaves the individual 
with every opportunity, along with the full responsibility, for discovering and 
exploring the “path to life.”7
By observing people attentively, one can note constant applications or even 
the most simple indications of this. Imagine for example two brothers of seven 
and ten years of age. Both are in the waiting shed of the train platform hopping 
on one foot, trying not to deviate from a certain (agreed upon) line on the 
tiled ground. When the younger of the two tries it out, the older introduces 
a new rule when he notices how his younger brother tries to lean against the 
waiting shed so as not to deviate from the line: “Strict rule: you may not hold 
on to anything!” !is negative rule, this prohibition that sets a boundary 
and thus hurts, does indeed create space for growth and self-transcendence. 
!e younger of the two, who is not yet adept at hopping on one foot without 
surreptitiously holding on to something now and then, is challenged by the 
“strict” - negative - rule laid by his older, more experienced brother to truly 
 6 St John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor: On Some Fundamental Questions of the Church’s Moral 
Teaching (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993), chap.1 (“Teacher, what good must I do…?” 
Mt 19:16: Christ and the answer to the question), no.13.
 7 Louis Janssens, “Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics,” Louvain Studies 6, no.2 (1977): 
203-238.
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try to hop on one foot without holding on to anything and thus discover a new 
creative possibility. 
Or to use an analogy taken from a football game: prohibitions draw out only 
the lines on the football !eld within which a qualitative football game can be 
played. ey only make possible the football game; of themselves they are in no 
way the game itself. Even when there are perfect and indisputable game rules, of 
themselves they do not guarantee a qualitative football game. Even the referee 
does not o#er any certainty for high-class football. He is only there to lead the 
game in the right direction, and he is a$er all only “visible” when an oence 
is committed. Only then does he intervene to prevent the football game from 
being aected as such, without concerning himself further with the quality of 
the game. e referee does not blow the whistle, for instance, to point out to 
the public any “magni!cent” action by one of the players or of the entire team. 
For a qualitative football game, more is needed, namely good players who under 
the leadership of a skilled trainer not only develop further their playing capacity 
but also form together a team with “spirit.” In the same manner, prohibitions 
are like boundary rules that draw the lines within which human dignity can be 
developed, without themselves determining and developing qualitatively this 
human dignity. 
How the Good and the Beautiful Converge
For a positive approach of meaningful life children and youngsters do 
not so much need behavioural norms that prescribe how they must live and 
act humanely, but rather they need suggestive examples, inspiring models, 
testimonies and qualitative experiences of others, that are “appealing and 
attractive” to them without being moralising in a paternalistic and patronising 
manner. As the saying rightly has it, “examples speak louder than words.” Or to 
paraphrase Max Scheler “ere is nothing in this world that at the same time 
originally, immediately and necessarily brings a person herself or himself to 
become good as the clear and adequate contemplate of a good person in her or 
his goodness.”8 When the ethical good comes to them in “beauty,” they are more 
easily attracted to it, so much so that they become more inclined to substantiate 
it. e emotion of their desire is literally a#ected and provoked. ey strive to 
integrate and to substantiate in their own way - thus creatively - the values that 
take shape in the examples and ways of life. With this, we arrive at the aesthetic 
dimension of ethics, which does not so much concern itself with the bottom line 
 8 Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt toward 
the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
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boundaries of the minimum, but rather with the optimum as the perspective of 
“meaning-fullness,” to be understood - according to the Christian tradition - as 
the fullness of love (agape). In this manner, “wild desire” can be transformed 
into “civilised desire” (see ina). And this at the same time realises a synthesis 
between emotion and desire, and the objectivity of the law, without either being 
reduced to the other nor played out against each other.
!e ethical communication process presupposes not only the participation 
in the ethically lived-out life of individual persons, but likewise and especially of 
“moral communities” (McIntyre, Hauerwas).9 It is by means of tradition, meaning 
to say by what has been handed down and thus precedes us, that we can, with 
taste and conviction, make certain attitudes, modes of behaviour and lifestyles 
our own. Ethics and education can never be a “one man show,” a solipsistic aair. 
We are dependent on our “predecessors” in order to be able to grow towards 
moral sensitivity, truth and praxis. No one becomes ethically sensitive and 
procient without parents and grandparents, family, relatives, educators and the 
wider community, out of which new people time and again receive the chance 
to discover and to tread their path of life. It is precisely through this community 
life anchored in space and time that ethical aesthetics, which is indispensable in 
achieving a “love-lled” living and acting, takes shape. In other words, it is not 
just “important” that people are able to participate in moral communities - it is as 
necessary as the air we breathe. In such moral communities, ethical quality is not 
underestimated. Ethical quality carries with it a stimulus by means of its “beauty,” 
in order to grow towards that which is meaningful, which means loving, each one 
according to his or her own possibilities and fragilities or limitations. Because of 
this participative character, we call these moral communities “communities of 
participation.” In such communities of life people - throughout the generations 
- share with each other’s ethical inspiration and thus give a solid grounding to 
their own ethical commitment and make it “bearable.” Only by participating 
in concrete ethical projects, wherein the commitment of the whole person is 
involved - not only one’s intellect, but also one’s desire, emotion, fantasy, body 
and will - can children and young people acquire the chance to develop from the 
inside out a delicate taste for a love-lled life and its related actions. Whoever 
cannot “share” in values, modes of behaviour and life, and this in the double 
sense of “co-experiencing” and also “co-constructing,” can never acquire a 
sensitivity and taste for what is a meaningful and loving life, neither for the joy 
that the eort and “burden” thereof can bring along. Without a community of 
 9 Alasdair MacIntyre, A!er Virtue: A Study in Moral #eory, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 
1985): Stanley Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Re$ection (Notre Dame, 
IN: Fides, 1974).
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participation, children and youngsters can never discover that virtue not only 
takes e!ort and sacri"ces, but also the fact that “it does one good.”
We can "nd a concrete illustration of this in the importance of “eating together” 
and the “family table.” e starting point for this illustration is anecdotic. When I 
returned from Minster (Kent, UK) a$er a three-day formation at the Fraternities 
of Charles de Foucauld (26-28 April 2012), I read an article in the Daily 
Telegraph10 while waiting at Heathrow Airport. e article was about a research 
on “the decline of family meals” and its impact on the “social skills” of children. A 
sociological study came to the conclusion that (especially in cities) one out of ten 
adults no longer eat together with their children, and that another 10% eat together 
with their children only once a week. According to another research, the increase 
of TV meals on the sofa deprives children of “vital skills.” Children grow up and 
miss the opportunity to talk with adults, to exchange ideas, and to learn “good 
manners,” says Richard Harman, chairman of the Boarding Schools’ Association. 
He adds that the decline of family meals is moreover linked with a “health risk,” 
namely an increased intake of high fat content food. is “decline of family meals” 
likewise runs parallel with a strong emphasis in schools and families and in popular 
culture (among others in teen magazines, weeklies, on TV and social media…) on 
personal ambition (“getting somewhere”) and material success whereby the “self-
esteem” of children is changing severely. We are getting a generation of children and 
youngsters that is “out of balance,” with some having too low self-esteem (because 
they cannot reach the norms of “ambition”) and others having too high self-esteem 
precisely because they (are able to) go along with the “ambition”-ideology wherein 
attention is given to creating a “circle of in&uence” rather than to striving for a 
“circle of concern.” e emphasis on material success and “achieving something in 
life” comes at the expense of “establishing a sense of belonging” and that leads to an 
“inversion” of fundamental values and its consequences. Our school and education 
systems, and our public culture and mentality, says Harman, turn values on their 
heads whereby essential values are a!ected. Children are told that they “will belong 
somewhere” when they achieve material success, while they "rst have to belong 
somewhere - emotionally and spiritually - in order to draw out con"dence and to 
concretise their personal development and ambition. Apparently, we are gradually 
paying a he$y price for dissolving the connectedness that serves as the "rst and 
essential source of value development. And he concludes: “As a society, we have 
lost the bene"cial e!ects of sharing a meal around the table. Eating together 
has, since the earliest times, been the most formative way of building a sense of 
togetherness and facilitating conversation across the generations. But in the United 
 10 Daily Telegraph, April 30, 2012, 10.
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States and increasingly in the UK, a lot of families don’t even have a dining table. 
A sense of sharing, reaching out to other people and the ability to form and sustain 
relationships is just not valued as much as it was.”
Landmarks for a Consistent Relational and Sexual Ethic
Let us now illustrate the paradoxical relationship between prohibition, 
creative freedom, and desire on the basis of the four already cited prohibitions 
from the second tablet of the Ten Commandments, which are also presented 
by Jesus in the narrative of the rich man as a path to life.11 We will direct our 
attention especially to interpersonal and intimate relationships. It will thus 
also become clear how the four prohibitions create the conditions for every 
qualitative life of love whatever the concrete forms may be. Without denying 
diversity, we are looking for an ethic “beyond diversity.” In other words, our 
project of a “consistent relational ethic” will be given a concrete elucidation. 
Before we enter in the concrete prohibitions as conditions for a qualitative 
intimate love, we must !rst point out the positive, hidden inner side of the 
prohibition. If we try to formulate intuitively a prohibition, a shi" of level 
always occurs. While the prohibition forbids a concrete, negative deed or act, 
for instance “to kill,” “to lie,” “to steal,” “to commit adultery” - where it turns 
out that a prohibition also implies a double denial, namely not doing something 
negative - the corresponding commandment acts on the level of the “disposition” 
or attitude, to be understood as “virtue” or quality of the moral personality. And 
what is remarkable is that this dispositional or attitudinal norm does not prescribe 
in terms of content what must be done concretely - like the corresponding norm 
of action, the commandment - nor does it determine normatively the behaviour 
(as has already been mentioned above). 
“You Shall Not Kill” and a Culture of Respectful and Caring Proximity
We will start with “you shall not kill”: the prohibition that not coincidentally 
takes !rst place, since it also forms the condition for the other prohibitions. In the 
negative formulation of the prohibition “you shall not kill,” the commandment 
 11 Even though Jesus does not mention the last prohibition of the second tablet of the Ten 
Commandments, namely “you shall not covet… anything that belongs to your neighbour,” 
we still would like to pay explicit attention to it a"er the relational interpretation of the four 
behavioural prohibitions that Jesus did cite. is last prohibition of the Ten Commandments has 
to do with the relationship between desire and behaviour, the theme that takes a central position 
in the consistent relational ethic which we advocate. 
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is about an action that one may not do. In its fullest sense, this commandment 
means that no violence may be done to another person, as well as the idea 
that no form of coercion, blackmail or manipulation may be exercised over a 
person. !is prohibition is applicable to every form of violence, and thus it is 
also germane to physical, emotional, psychological, sexual, relational and social 
violence. Hence, forms of sexual abuse like rape, incest, paedophilia, violation of 
chastity, or sexual contact without the consent of one of the parties involved, are 
totally unacceptable. !is also applies to sexually deviant behaviour whereby - 
verbally or non-verbally, consciously or unconsciously - certain forms of sexually 
oriented behaviour are experienced as negative, undesirable or enforced via one 
or the other forms of emotional dominance or abuse of power.12
When we attempt to express this prohibition positively, we arrive at the 
commandment “you shall have respect for life,” or likewise at the task of respect for 
the other, quality of presence, tenderness, and so forth. !is positive formulation 
only indicates the fundamental attitude that the execution of the prohibition 
“you shall not kill” supports. !is fundamental attitude is consequently expressed 
in an imperative that is no longer a behavioural rule, but a dispositional norm 
that indicates a manner of being, a value orientation, a kind of sensitivity. Such a 
dispositional norm actually says nothing about concrete acting or behaviour. Just 
as modest as the prohibition, the dispositional norm only indicates which moral 
personality one must have, how one must be, but with that, it does not yet say 
what one must do concretely. !e dispositional norm concerns the soul or the 
heart of action, without saying anything about the concrete content of the action 
that must then substantiate the respect for life. And for this respect and love, 
the corresponding prohibition only indicates the utterly minimal condition, 
namely the inadmissibility of any form of violence, without laying down further 
anything normative. 
Let us apply this to the ethics of relationships. No qualitative relationship is 
possible when the norm “you shall not kill” is not respected. If the one coerces, 
blackmails or puts another person under pressure in order to enter into a 
relationship, or commits one or the other forms of violence in the relationship 
itself, a loving relationship is out of the question. On the level of the relationship 
between man and woman, for instance, this implies an unambiguous critique 
and even a radical condemnation of sexism and patriarchal domination, whereby 
inequality is operative or maintained. However, when one does not coerce 
the other and does not take advantage of her/his feelings, one has not done 
 12 Annenmie Dillen, ed., When “Love” Strikes: Social Sciences, Ethics and eology on Family 
Violence (Leuven: Peeters, 2009), 61-146.
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anything tangible and constructive. By not “killing” each other or not using any 
form of pressure or violence whatsoever, there is still no talk of an experienced 
tenderness, to be understood as a quality of proximity. However, the condition 
for tenderness, and more broadly still, for every form of qualitative relationship, 
is indeed present. Space is created. ere is space contained in the glass that is not 
yet lled up. Nevertheless, the space at the top is necessary to prevent the contents 
from being spilled. It is up to the couple to discover together within the space 
created what are now the positive signals and forms of that respectful tenderness 
that benets them. To ll up the glass is not only not doing something, but also 
doing something concrete. For this concrete action, however, one cannot rely on 
the prohibition. For that purpose, one must appeal entirely to the capabilities 
and achievements of one’s own creative freedom in order to design forms of non-
violent proximity in a creative and substantial way. Concretely, this implies the 
challenge of dynamically interpreting and lling in the “quality of presence.” 
And this is applicable to all intimate relationships, whether they are temporary 
or steady, heterosexual or homosexual in nature, marital or non-marital.13
“You Shall Not Lie” and a Culture of Genuine Communication
e second prohibition, “you shall not lie,” speaks out against telling untruths 
and lying to people, thereby deceiving them. Just as in the other prohibitions, 
as a negative formulation this one is also about a double negation, a negative 
attitude towards the negative. e prohibition relates to a negative action that is 
forbidden. It is a rejection and a denial of an untruth, in this case, every form of 
falsehood, untrustworthiness and suspicion.14
Formulated positively, the prohibition of speaking falsehood articulates 
the fundamental attitude of “being honest” as an appeal to genuineness and 
truthfulness. It is again apparent from this that the corresponding commandment 
is not a behavioural rule, but a dispositional norm. e attitudinal norm intended, 
“you shall be honest and true,” again, is not lled in. It does not say what that 
honesty concretely implies in community or relational and social life. If one 
observes the prohibition and speaks no untruth, one has not yet done anything 
in order to cultivate trust. Everything still has to begin. Without normative 
requirements that prescribe concrete behaviours, the space is kept open for a 
culture of mutual trust, reliability and authenticity. e prohibition “you shall 
not lie” states, in other words, only the minimal condition for truthfulness and 
 13 Jack Dominian, Passionate and Compassionate Love: A Vision for Christian Marriage 
(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1991), 59-88, 196-198.
 14 Martin Rovers, Healing the Wounds in Couple Relationships (Ottawa: Novalis, 2005).
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thus rather rests on the level of the confrontation, in such a way that freedom 
is not curbed, but is rather stimulated. Precisely in this way, creative ethical 
freedom is challenged to search for concrete measures and signs that inspire trust 
and enable and give shape to a genuine inter-human and social intercourse.
We can yet clarify in another way the positive signi!cance of the negatively 
formulated behavioural norm or prohibition to speak untruths on the basis of the 
so-called “rule of inverted universality.” According to Kant’s rule of universality, 
a type of behaviour is ethically justi!ed when one can demand that under similar 
conditions everyone makes the same choice or does the same action that one 
permits oneself or poses as a “law.” In other words, a rule of behaviour only has 
the force of validity when it is universally applicable. If we now take and invert a 
negatively formulated rule of behaviour, meaning to say, making the transgression 
of this norm universally applicable, then out of this we can learn much about the 
positive value that the prohibition tries to protect in a delimiting way. us, if 
we reverse the general validity of the prohibition against speaking untruths and 
say: “you should [or can] always and everywhere tell untruths to everyone in all 
circumstances,” then the consequence is that on a social and relational level, both 
in the short term and certainly in the mid-to-long run, the trust between people 
is violated or even made impossible. e tightly and restrictedly formulated 
prohibition against lies therefore protects the full-#edged positive relational 
and social value of trust and reliability upon which we must be able to count 
on mutually in order to be able to deal with each other and live with each other 
in a humane way. In other words, the idea of a generalized annulment of the 
prohibition helps us to ascertain the consequences of our actions on a social level 
and in the long run. And this applies not only to the prohibition on untruth, but 
also to the other prohibitions that will be discussed further on.
On the level of the experience of relationships, the prohibition of insincerity 
requires a special attention for the trueness of expressions, for the genuineness 
of what one says, communicates and does. "is implies, rst of all, the summons 
to learn to express feelings, and not to bury them or repress them. It likewise 
implies the invitation to express these feelings as honestly as possible, meaning 
to say to express them in agreement with one’s own thinking, feeling and being as 
much as possible. "is requires a commitment for a “culture of righteousness and 
authenticity,” which must be developed by the persons involved in their mutual 
relationships in a creative way and with Fingerspitzengefühl (careful sensitivity). 
"is appeal to authenticity does not mean, however, that one must always say 
directly and brutally what is on one’s mind. Sincerity and transparency are also 
an art, namely the art of estimating whereby one looks for the right moment and 
the right circumstances, the right tone and rendition. It is indeed a challenge 
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to nd a dynamic balance between directness (saying everything always and 
immediately) and carefulness (taking into account each other’s uniqueness and 
vulnerability). Brutality and roughness can make it impossible for the other to 
listen, with the risk that a dialogue of the deaf ensues with mutual recriminations 
or sulky silence. In this regard, the prohibition against lying is not only about 
speaking the truth or an untruth but also about communication or the way 
in which truth is communicated. e communication must be reliable but 
also considerate. And this simply applies to all forms and styles of intimate 
relationships and life forms, whether these relationships are of short or long - 
lifelong - duration, homosexual or heterosexual, marital or otherwise….
“You Shall Not Steal” and a Culture of Shared Dierence
e prohibition “you shall not steal” formulates the condition for a 
fundamental attitude of respect for the property of others and for the “mine and 
thine,” for each person’s property and for each person’s unique characteristics in 
relational and social intercourse. One may not absorb everything of the other, but 
must have respect for the contribution and the uniqueness of this other. Indeed, 
a relationship rests on the reciprocity and equality of persons whereby each may 
contribute from one’s own resources. Just as this was already made apparent in the 
two previous prohibitions, this “inner side” for the experience of the prohibition 
is of immeasurable value. Without this fundamental attitude of attention for 
each person’s uniqueness and contribution, the observance of the prohibition 
degenerates into an obedience without content and without essence, which 
only aspires to not getting into trouble and thus, whenever possible, avoiding 
punishment or “hell.” Only when the “heart” is present can obedience to the 
prohibition become a personally lived out and fervent ethical action. In whatever 
way one should respect someone else’s property, as well as what a culture of the 
contribution of oneself and of the other might mean concretely, in a relationship, 
one must discover and create friendship, relationship and community. Ethics 
does not impose these things. Rather, ethics opens the perspective for a dynamic 
and cordial development of a culture of di!erence.
In the area of relationships between intimate partners, the prohibition on 
“the"” creates the conditions for the respect of “mine and thine,” again without 
lling this in concretely in terms of its content. “You shall not steal” protects as 
a “condition” the culture of di!erence, of the recognition and establishment of 
not being the same, and yet being equal. What is mine is not yours; the other 
is irreducible to the one. A loving, non-violent, real and righteous intimate 
partnership should avoid all subordination without recognition of diversity. 
What partners contribute to a relationship is then fully equal despite their 
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being-di erent, whereby their mutual contribution obviously cannot be so 
fundamentally di erent that communication and exchange would no longer 
be possible. When di erence is foundational for the relationship, then this 
means a reaction in principle against all forms of absorption, against all forms 
of enslavement in the relationship wherein the one becomes so dependent on 
the other, or the one becomes so strongly the image of the other, that the one 
no longer thinks, judges, acts and lives by and for oneself, but through the other. 
Out of one’s own sensitivity, this non-fusional relationship that relies on equality 
in di erence and di erence in equality can take shape in a creative and dynamic 
way. And this applies to every form or domain of relationships, eroticism and 
sexuality, be it homosexual or heterosexual, short term or covenantal, marital or 
pre- and non-marital relationship. 
Here we must point out the need for a culture of di erence15 that goes against 
the amalgamating dream of unity in the view on romantic love that is again in 
the rage especially (but not exclusively) among young lovers. Driven by being 
in love, lovers dream of a reciprocity whereby they feel for each other in such a 
way that they hope to become completely one. "e longing for oneness can be so 
strong that they are willing to cancel themselves completely just to “#t” with the 
other. "ey dream of a relationship wherein both would become “the same.” "is 
sameness is accompanied by a huge encompassing feeling wherein the magical 
oneness would only be broken by words. Both want to feel together, in and 
through each other, without barriers, level di erences, aggressive outbursts or 
contradictions. "ey are so touched by each other that pure - both in the sense 
of mere as well as pure - emotion gives them the impression that they are meant 
for each other and will thus love each other “for eternity,” while it is only their 
desire that the other will always cherish them that is indestructible. But they 
do not (yet) get this point. "eir wrinkle-free, harmonious oneness, however, 
is an illusion that sooner or later will be shattered to pieces by the reality of 
unavoidable di erence, and this in all areas of their personality and relationship. 
"en partners are called to grieve over their “boundless-adhesive oneness” and 
discover di erence as a source of their two-oneness. A non-reducing relationship 
is only possible when one gives up adjusting to the other in order to be and to 
show oneself, and thus also allow the other the opportunity to exist, to feel, to 
speak and to act out of the other’s self. A “non-stealing” relationship then begins 
with the acknowledgement of the di erence between “mine and thine.” And 
note well, that respect is positive and dynamic. It surpasses every form of fatalism 
that simply accepts reality because it cannot be otherwise. In the two-oneness 
 15 Alfons Vansteenwegen, Liefde na Verschil (Tielt: Lannoo, 1995).
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partners choose for dierence. In their eorts at preparedness to listen, they 
bridge the dierence without cancelling it, but make present the acceptable and 
the discussable. By means of the conscious choice for communication, partners 
speak healing words to each other. Out of this communicative dynamic, which 
nds its bedding in dierence, creativity arises. Out of the clash of two worlds 
arises a new world, a new space of being together and living together, despite of 
and thanks to dierence. Attentive communication makes possible that partners 
come to a mutually shared feeling that both rely on the acknowledgement of 
each other’s equality as well as on the experience of each other’s dierence.16
is acknowledgement and culture of dierence, however, is also faced with 
the challenge to make each other’s alterity a source of mutual enrichment. Indeed 
the risk is not inconceivable that one places too much emphasis on individuality 
whereby both partners strive separately for each one’s own autonomy and self-
development. What arises then is a “being together apart” or a “living together 
apart,” which is doomed to failure. at is precisely why the relationship therapist, 
Jürg Willi, points out the need for “co-evolution,” namely growing together in 
and through the development of a commonality. By experiencing and doing 
things “together,” whereby the dierence in experiencing does not remain beside 
each other but is shared with each other, one creates through time a common 
life world. is “evolving together” is necessary in order to arrive at a stable, 
lasting relationship eectively. If partners do not evolve together suciently, 
they unavoidably grow apart so much so that they even threaten to become 
strangers to each other. It is nevertheless an exciting adventure for partners to 
stimulate mutually each other’s development, for precisely in that manner does 
an existentially unbreakable “we” arise.17
“You Shall Not Commit Adultery” and a Culture of Creative Fidelity
e prohibition “You shall not commit adultery” nally formulates in a 
negative way what is not permitted in a sexual relationship. It is the most specic 
rule of the four prohibitions discussed, precisely because - in contrast to the three 
other prohibitions - it deals with the area of sex. e term “adultery” evokes two 
aspects: on the one hand, a sexual signicance that puts emphasis on sexual 
deception; on the other, a legal-institutional signicance that lays emphasis on 
the breaking of the exclusive bond of marriage. In our re!ection we pay attention 
 16 Jean-Claude Sagne, L’homme et la femme dans le champ de la parole (Paris: Desclée de 
Brouwer, 1995), 30-43, 74-75.
 17 Jüng Willi, Psychologie der Liebe: Persönliche Entwicklung durch Partnerbeziehungen 
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2002).
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especially to the experiential aspect of sexual indelity or “cheating.” "us space 
can be kept open to apply the prohibition not only to heterosexual but also 
to homosexual relationships. It would be a notable form of discrimination to 
develop a dierent and thus “inferior” or inconsistent ethics with regard to gays 
and lesbians than for man and woman.18
Behind the negative formulation of the prohibition of “cheating” and 
adultery, hides the positive fundamental attitude of “you must be faithful.” 
Only the essence, the bottom line, the minimum condition is implied by the 
prohibition and posed as obligatory. Trust is out of the question when one 
commits adultery, namely when one has sexual relations with another other 
than one’s own partner. Now this indelity, however, should not be understood 
only in a sexual manner. "e letter of the prohibition against adultery is dead 
without the spirit of delity. As a disposition or virtue, delity is in the rst 
place relational, which means that aside from sexual indelity, there are other 
numerous forms of relational indelity possible. "us, on the relational eld 
one can neglect the other, no longer give priority to the other, treat the other 
with indierence, and so forth. We include these and other forms of relational 
indelity in the prohibition against indelity, just as relational delity is likewise 
implied in the commandment to be faithful.
With this, we touch the core of a loving sexual-relational relationship, without 
however eshing this out normatively in terms of content. We stumble upon the 
most demanding prohibition in terms of content, since it puts under critique 
those intimate forms of relationships and modes of cohabitation that do not 
pose exclusivity and stability as conditions. "e prohibition against adultery - as 
a commandment of delity - explicitly states that sexual cohabitation is assured 
of a very di%cult future and quality if it is not based on a promise of sexual 
exclusivity and delity. Tradition puts such a strong emphasis on this because - 
on the basis of experiential wisdom through the centuries - it is convinced that 
delity is of invaluable worth not only for the happiness and success of a couple’s 
sexual cohabitation but also for the wellbeing of possible children and of society. 
Just like the other previous prohibitions, this prohibition thus protects only 
the “condition” for delity, which precedes the experience of faithfulness itself, 
without in any way further prescribing what one indeed must do in order to be 
really faithful. What the concrete shape of a good sexual and relational life as a 
culture of delity consists of, is not - fortunately - normatively stipulated by the 
prohibition. What is mentioned is only that one should not commit the “act” of 
 18 Eric Fuchs, Sexual Desire and Love: Origins and History of the Christian Ethics of Sexuality 
and Marriage (New York: Scabury, 1982), 177-181, 192-206.
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adultery, and not which erotic and sexual “act” one must indeed perform. It is the 
task of the couple to discover this for themselves. In other words, it is le to both 
partners; but an appeal is truly made to both to nd out that culture of sexual 
and relational trust and to unfold it with much pleasure. Aer all, the challenge 
is not only to nd out, but also to discover, to invent, to explore and to grow. 
Here, persons may and must be creative in order to give dynamic and meaningful 
shape to a faithful sexual relationship.19
Naturally, this does not mean that the meaningfulness of delity can be 
developed in whichever direction. It is not for nothing that the prohibition 
against adultery comes as the last of the cited prohibitions. However, it is not 
only an end point; it likewise forms a synthesis insofar as it not only presupposes 
the previous prohibitions but also binds them to itself. It indeed takes upon 
itself the preceding prohibitions as essential for one’s own realization. ose 
prohibitions also count as conditions for an exclusive, faithful sexual partner 
relationship, without itself unfolding this exclusivity and stability in terms of its 
content. When partners do not kill each other or do not exercise any violence 
or force against each other, when they do not lie to each other, when they do 
not steal the other’s uniqueness or reduce the other to oneself, and when they 
do not commit adultery, then it is up to them to develop resourcefully - literally 
mit Lust und Liebe - a culture of faithful sexual relationship. en all the rest 
still remains to be done, and this accrues to them and no one else: it is given to 
them “freely and generously” as a task and an opportunity. us, even when the 
prohibition against adultery needs to be understood “inclusively” with regard 
to the preceding prohibitions, the insight remains intact that throughout all 
these prohibitions together nothing yet is said about the concrete lling in of 
the experience of sexual and relational faithfulness in an exclusive and stable life 
relationship. In this sense, in no way does the prohibition against adultery, just 
like every preceding prohibition in fact, put a damper on self-determination. 
Instead, the prohibition challenges one to authenticate oneself in a “love-lled” 
way in a faithful partnership of life. And, once again, this applies not only to the 
marital relationship but also to pre-, post- and non-marital relationships, not 
only for heterosexual but also for homosexual relationships.20
 19 Roger Troisfontaines, De l’existence à l’être: La philosophie de Gabriel Marcel, 2nd ed. 
(Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1968), 1: 360-388; 2: 9-39.
 20 Margaret A. Farley, Just Love. A $amework for Christian Sexual Ethics (New York: 
Continuum, 2007), 223-226.
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“You Shall Not Covet Anything that is Your Neighbour’s”: 
To Love with a Pure Heart
 e narrative of the rich young man lacks the literal reference to the 
last prohibition of the Ten Commandments as it is worded in Exodus and 
Deuteronomy: “You shall not covet… anything that belongs to your neighbour” 
(Ex 20:17; Dt 5:21). And yet the prohibition is not entirely absent, just as 
elsewhere in the Gospels it is not missing in Jesus (cf. Mt 15:18-20; Lk 6:45). 
From the beginning of the narrative, mention is already made of the desire 
of the rich young man for a full life. We shall thus focus our attention on the 
last prohibition of the second tablet precisely for the reason that it is rather 
encompassing, as will be seen below.21
 e "rst matter that draws our attention is how this prohibition is no longer 
about a behavioural norm but about that which precedes action, namely the 
mainspring and the inspiration of action. ere are no four violations or sins 
(cf. also Am 2:6-8), there is but one form of evil: derailed desire. In this regard 
we can call the last prohibition the “soul” of the entire second tablet and thus 
the inner side and the capstone of all preceding prohibitions. A#er all, it is no 
longer about a particular behaviour, but about the heart and the guts or viscera 
of the person, namely about the relationship to one’s desires, one’s dedication 
and passion. And this relationship can be found on the level of one’s aspiration, 
emotion and will, before it comes to be expressed in tangible practices. 
Furthermore, this is not simply about desire in and of itself. is is important 
because otherwise the prohibition could lead to a rejection of desire per se. 
But in reality, desire is the root of human dreams, ideals, wishes, expectations, 
endeavours and goals, as the conversation between Jesus and the rich young 
man demonstrates. ere is no human creativity and activity without drive 
and desire. Life is desire. Existentially speaking, a person without desire is 
dead, even though one still lives. Plato expressed one of the characteristics of 
human desire as such: not only is it a child of “plenitude and wealth,” and 
thus of strength and energy, which can be taken as a sign of fullness; it is also 
a child of “need and poverty.” Indeed, desire is also necessity, and as necessity 
it strives for that which it does not have. is de"ciency makes one step out 
of oneself towards the other than oneself in order to "nd there that which 
can complement one’s own de"ciency. In other words, one seeks to "nd a 
solution for one’s own mortality, and at the same time to acquire satisfaction 
and su$ciency - whereby the su%ering that ensues from one’s own de"ciency 
is annulled.
 21 Marc-Alain Ouaknin, Les dix commandements (Paris: Seuil, 1999), 245-275.
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It is apparent from all this how the negativity that characterizes desire has a 
healthy and wholesome dimension. At the same time, it turns out that desire is 
ambiguous since it is also characterized by risk. is is apparent from the way in 
which the last prohibition of the second tablet is formulated. Indeed, it forbids 
us from appropriating that which does not belong to us: the house, the eld, 
the cattle, the slave, the wife… of our neighbour. at which we lack or need, 
we would like to draw to ourselves. In other words, desire as necessity becomes 
a form of “reduction of the other to the same” (Levinas). Desire becomes a 
drive to possess. And of itself, this drive to possess knows no boundaries. In its 
spontaneous absoluteness, it wants the other entirely for itself. e other must 
be everything for me, entirely directed towards me, part and parcel of myself, 
and this both on the material and economic level as well as on the psychological, 
relational, social and spiritual levels. On the basis of my self-interested indigence, 
I see in the other a means and a possibility to develop my existence. Hence, I 
would like to get to know and understand the other, which in extension of the 
dynamism of necessity leads to direct or subtle forms of “grasping for the other.” 
ink of how the idea “to understand” is synonymous with the word “grasp”: to 
catch, to contain, to assimilate…. Hence the expression: “I like you so much I can 
just eat you up!” Indeed, the formulation of the last prohibition of the Decalogue 
has to do with desire for the other in order “to eat up” the other (to absorb, to 
possess, to dominate). “To eat up” means to annul the dierence between me 
and the other. at which one eats becomes oneself, so that the other disappears 
in me, becomes a part of me. en the other stops being an “other-in front of-
me.” To eat up the other is to destroy the other as other. And thereby the other is 
deprived of the “word,” meaning to say deprived of speech as self-expression, as 
the articulation of his/her otherness. e prohibition against covetousness not 
only sets boundaries on desire - desire that is le to itself, that wants everything 
altogether and thus also wants the other “for oneself ” - it likewise questions 
that covetousness. is crisis of possessive desire makes possible that the other 
is acknowledged as other. In so doing, the correct relationship to the other is 
established, or rather the relationship as an ethical task and choice is established. 
Here, the shudder as the dynamism of restraint is introduced into desire. Humane 
desire is striving to touch the other, and at the same time there is the shuddering 
of this touch, an already drawing back to oneself in the act of touching: just 
narrowly coming into contact without collusion or fusion. e humanism of 
the Ten Commandments is, in other words, the humanism of the other person 
that should never be gobbled up nor assimilated. Desiring that which belongs to 
the other - possessive desire - leads to destroying, denying, disdaining the other 
(murder); it leads to cheating the other, both by untruthfulness as well as by 
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unfaithfulness; it leads to stealing from the other, whereby the uniqueness of 
the other (and of myself !) is annulled. Possessive desire is jealous of the other 
and attempts to assimilate the other so that the other not only becomes “mine” 
be also becomes “me.” I desire not only that which the other has, but also what 
the other is. Possessive desire destroys the irreducible otherness of the other, and 
thus the authentic “face-to-face.” It is precisely in order to make possible this 
relationship of acknowledgement, respect and a"rmation of the other that all 
prohibitions of the second tablet count as “fundamental conditions for love” - 
this love being animated by the culture of a “civilized desire.”
A Consistent Ethic for a Diversity of Intimate Relationships
In numerous Christian churches all the non-marital intimate relationships 
are quali#ed as forms of “sin,” “deviant behaviour” or “irregular lifestyles.” ese 
behaviours are quali#ed by the Catholic Church as ethically illicit, namely as grave 
sins of impurity, lewdness and concubinage (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 
nos. 2351-2356). We cannot deny however the widespread phenomenon, 
even among Christians, of these dierent forms of intimate relationship and 
cohabitation, whether civilly recognized and institutionalized or not, as it is also 
honestly acknowledged by the double Synod on the Family (2014-2015).22 But 
there is more going on than the fact that Christians are actually deviating from 
the church marital norm. More and more Christians - certainly in the West, but 
also elsewhere - no longer consider those pre-, post- and non-marital intimate life 
forms as immoral but, on the contrary, as acceptable and at times even desirable. 
Most couples, for instance, who in their relationships move on to sexual intimacy 
#nd that abstaining from it would be “against nature,” or in contradiction to an 
integral-incarnated love. Or pre-marital couples that live together are convinced 
that their cohabitation is desirable as a realistic and adequate preparation for 
the high demands of marital commitment, certainly in a complex society like 
ours.23 Idem ditto for gays and lesbians who begin a love relationship. ey #nd 
 22 Synod of Bishops, III Extraordinary General Assembly (2014), !e Pastoral Challenges of the 
Family in the Context of Evangelisation: Instrumentum Laboris, June 26, 2014; Synod of Bishops, 
XIV Ordinary General Assembly (2015), Relatio ante Disceptationem, October 6, 2014; Synod 
of Bishops, 14 Ordinary General Assembly (2015), !e Vocation and Mission of the Family in the 
Church and Contemporary World: Lineamenta 2014; Relatio Synodi, October 5-19, 2014; Synod 
of Bishops, XIV Ordinary General Assembly (2015), !e Vocation and Mission of the Family in 
the Church and Contemporary World: Instrumentum Laboris, June 23, 2015; Synod of Bishops, 
XIV Ordinary General Assembly 2015, Relazione Finale del Sinodo dei Vescovi al Santo Padre 
Francesco, October 24, 2015. 
 23 In this regard, perhaps we can speak of a “marriage of desire” as analogous to “baptism of 
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“living in abstinence,” as the church asks of them, not only impossible but also in 
contradiction to who they are and to the love to which they deem they are called 
as equally dignied human beings. In the same line, most remarried divorcees 
nd it not only factually impossible to live together “like brother and sister”; 
they do not want it either (they nd it absurd, contradictory, even ridiculous to 
even dare pose this). In other words, in all these situations, the focus is not on 
deviant “facts” but about “facts” that express “lived convictions.”24 at is why it 
is more correct not only to label the above-mentioned behaviours as “deviant” 
but also as “heterodox,” precisely because they contrast with the “orthodox” 
view of the Catholic Church. In heterodox intimate relational behaviour, the 
acceptance in principle of the “church norm” is out of the question; one is aer 
all dedicated to a very dierent conviction. It is precisely these shied, “lived 
convictions” that are deemed valid that manifest themselves in and through the 
so-called deviant behaviours, that challenge current moral theology, pastoral 
and Christian education.
If Church and moral theology, but also projects of Christian education, 
hope that their view on love and sexuality would still be heard by believers 
at the base, namely by young people, another paradigm is needed that takes 
seriously the new lived convictions and acknowledges the quality of the 
corresponding behaviours. With that, yet another aspect of the new lived 
convictions is important. They presuppose after all a different concept of 
human behaviour than the act-orientated and static model of the Catholic 
moral doctrine, that one-sidedly focuses on judgement on individual acts 
“in themselves,” detached from any integration within a broader meaningful 
whole. Partners, for example, experience certain relational choices and sexual 
behaviours not as acts in themselves, but as part of a comprehensive way of 
life that furthermore unfolds itself as a process of growth. Hence our plea 
for the concept of “life form” wherein the distinct options, acts, behaviours 
and styles of interaction are not only integrated but derive from that their 
meaning and value as well. This would mean a qualitative life form that 
realizes and approaches meaningfulness. This has a direct link with the 
Christian striving for perfection: the progressive appropriation, knowledge 
and experience of love in its fullness in the distinct domains of life. This 
desire”: young adults who cohabit desire marriage as a goal, and experience their cohabitation 
as an important, even indispensable, learning process not only to reach that goal but also to be 
able to substantiate it as qualitatively as possible. Pre-marital cohabitation can thus be seen as a 
“marriage in the making” (matrimonium in eri), where an old term from church tradition is 
enriched and broadened.
 24 Wilhelm Kor, “Empirical Social Study and Ethics,” Concilium 35 (1968): 7-23.
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opens also the perspective on a Christian ethics of growth (a model that we 
developed elsewhere).
On the intimate-relational level, the Christian tradition gives preference to 
the life form of marriage as the basis for the family. e Second Vatican Council, 
and especially the chapter on marriage in Gaudium et Spes (1965), remains as an 
inspiration for us to describe and to further re!ect on marriage as a qualitative 
life form, namely as a covenant of “intimate partnership of life and love” (no. 
48). By putting love in a central position, the Council wanted to respond to the 
sensitivities of contemporary men and women who are convinced that the full 
meaning of life can be found in incarnated intimate love, qualied by Vatican 
II as “conjugal friendship” (conjugalis amicitia) (no. 49). At the same time, the 
Council avoids a sentimental reduction of love by emphasizing the di#erent 
dimensions of intimate covenant love.
is love is an eminently human one since it is directed from one person to 
another through an a#ection of the will; it involves the good of the whole person, 
and therefore can enrich the expressions of body and mind with a unique dignity, 
ennobling these expressions as special ingredients and signs of the friendship 
distinctive of marriage. is love God has judged worthy of special gi$s, healing, 
perfecting and exalting gi$s of grace and of charity. Such love, merging the 
human with the divine, leads the spouses to a free and mutual gi$ of themselves, a 
gi providing itself by gentle a#ection and by deed. Such love pervades the whole 
of their lives: indeed by its generous practice it grows better and grows greater 
(no. 49). 
It is this intimate covenant love that is open for children and anchors itself 
societally as an institute. And the Council sees this “adequate and integrally 
understood love” as a “goal-commandment” (Zielgebot), namely as a calling to 
be striven for, that realises and “perfects” itself gradually in a progressive process 
of growth, without it ever being completed.
To do justice to the heterodox behaviours mentioned above, and to the 
possible qualities they bear within themselves, we suggest an “enduring 
relationship of love” as a life form, which is mirrored, on the one hand, on 
marital love understood integrally and which broadens, on the other hand, this 
love into an intimate life relationship that is based on free and informed consent, 
exclusiveness and reciprocity, equality in di#erence, non-violence and authentic 
intimacy, and creative "delity. is manifold, distinct and at the same time 
intertwined dimension can never be reduced to one single act or choice. In other 
words, it is about a life form wherein all sorts of relational and intimate decisions, 
practices and styles of interaction with each other are linked and integrated, in 
order to substantiate itself through time - as a narrative and as history.
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On the basis of this concept of “enduring relationship of love” it is possible 
to develop a consistent relational and sexual ethics that is applicable not only 
to marriage but also to the deviant and heterodox intimate relationships of all 
kinds: heterosexual and homosexual relationships; pre-, non- and post-marital 
forms of intimate love and cohabitation. For this consistent ethics we nd 
inspiration in that great heritage from our Judaeo-Christian tradition, namely 
the second tablet of the Ten Commandments, as we have tried to elaborate 
above. All Christians are faced with the appeal to develop their life relationships, 
however deviant and heterodox they may be with regard to the doctrinal Church 
norm of heterosexual conjugal love, as humanely as possible. For that purpose, 
the four behavioural norms of the second tablet of the Ten Commandments, 
as they were introduced by Jesus in the narrative of the rich, respectable man, 
oer us an inspiring framework, which we now synthesize. “You shall not kill” 
states that no dignied intimate relationship is possible when partners inict 
violence and power abuse - in whatever form - on each other. “You shall not lie” 
makes it clear that a loving intimate relationship cannot be based on dishonesty, 
untruthfulness and inauthentic communication. “You shall not steal” means that 
partners should not reduce the other to oneself, nor should they dissolve their 
mutual dierences in fusionality, which likewise is a form of violence. “You shall 
not commit adultery” forbids sexual - and also other forms of - indelity. Last 
but not least, “You shall not covet anything that belongs to the other,” forbids in 
a synthetic and inclusive way every form of possessive and abusive desire. And 
since these are not about commandments but prohibitions, that only indicate 
the bottom line or the conditions for love without establishing further the 
qualitative content of that love, the parents are challenged through their creative 
freedom to develop for themselves, moved by a “pure heart” (Mt 5:18; Ps 24:4), 
the fullness of love and nd inspiration in the experiences and examples of others, 
individually and in the context of communities of participation.
Conclusion: Consistency without Equalization
In conclusion, we would like to emphasize that a consistent sexual and 
relational ethics should in no way lead to the axiological equalization or 
levelling of all intimate relational and cohabitation life forms with marriage. 
But, without denying the essential dierences, the qualitative similarities have 
likewise to be acknowledged. In this sense the dierence or diversity of relational 
life forms does not become the new and nal social and ethical norm, but the 
norm “beyond diversity” is the humane quality of an intimate relationship. 
!at is why a Christian ethics, that also wants to be educational and pastoral, 
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is faced with the challenge not only to develop orientations and rules for those 
who experience marriage according to the “Catholic Book” - or the “Christian 
Book” - but likewise for those who enter into a di!erent form of intimate, 
enduring relationship. Because the Gospel ethics is proclaiming an ethics of 
love, no other relational ethics is valid for heterosexuals and homosexuals, just 
as no distinct relational ethics exists for those who live in pre-marital, marital, 
non- or post-marital cohabitation. And surprisingly, it is the ancient text of the 
Ten Commandments that inspires us to draw out the new from the old (cf. Mt 
13:52).
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